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Masculine Law Firms 
Ann C. McGinley* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many large law firms have disappointing diversity records.1  Deb-
orah Rhode and Tiffani Darden have proposed a number of strategies 
for law firms to improve their diversity, including better evaluations, 
accountability, monitoring, and cultural commitment.2  All of these are 
important suggestions for bettering the conditions of employment for 
white female and minority lawyers in law firms.  But all of these mod-
els are, to a certain extent, based on the concept that there is a prob-
lem with women and minorities3 who are outsiders in law firms.4  The 
                                                                                                                           
 
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law.  J.D. 1982.  I would like 
to thank my colleagues Provost John White, Acting Dean Nancy Rapoport, and Library Director 
Jeanne Price, Library professor David McClure and Professor Jeff Stempel.  Further, I thank 
Professor Kerri Stone of FIU College of Law and the FIU Law Review for the invitation to 
participate in this symposium and the hard work the staff put into making it a very enjoyable and 
valuable experience.  
 1 See Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System: Constructing a Bridge Between 
Workplace Equity Theory & the Institutional Analyses of Bias in Corporate Law Firms, 30 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85, 92 (2009) (detailing the high attrition rate of minority associates 
in law firms); Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in 
Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042-46 (2011) (describing the “gap” between the 
principle of equality and the numbers of women and minority lawyers in law firms).  By “law 
firms,” I refer to the traditional, large law firms ordinarily encountered in major cities in the U.S. 
that have a large, often international, corporate and litigation practice.  Students in law schools 
call practice in these law firms, “Big Law.”  Many law students aspire to work in “Big Law” be-
cause it is the most prestigious and remunerative practice for new lawyers, and students perceive 
that jobs in “Big Law” will establish them for the remainder of their careers, whether they hope 
to be partners in “Big Law” or to work in other types of legal jobs.  Competition for hiring into 
these law firms is keen, especially since the economic recession of 2008.  As a result of the reces-
sion, large law firms have suffered, some of them declaring bankruptcy, while others rescinded 
offers made to law students for associate positions.  The Great Recession hit at a time when 
global changes, combined with technological advances, have made it cheaper for law firms to 
“outsource” legal work to lawyers in other countries like India, who, working as independent 
contractors, can deliver legal services in a more cost-effective manner.  Simultaneously, clients 
expect more value in legal services for their money than in the past; many are refusing to permit 
first-year associates to work on their cases.  
 2 Rhode, supra note 1, at 1072-77; Darden, supra note 1, at 113-19. 
 3 I use the term “women and minorities” because it is used regularly, but I do not intend 
to convey that all women are white or that minorities are not women.  
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problem, however, is much larger.  It lies with the masculine culture at 
law firms, which harms not only women, but also many men, white and 
of color.5  
This article uses Multidimensional Masculinities Theory 
(“MMT”) to examine the problems that women and minorities, and 
also many white men, have with law firms.  Multidimensional Mascu-
linities Theory, which is developed in Masculinities and the Law: A 
Multidimensional Approach,6 posits that masculinity (and by analogy, 
femininity) is not a response to biology, but is socially constructed.  
Social forces pressure men to engage in performances that construct 
their masculine identities.    
Large law firms are masculine places.  Although many partners 
espouse liberal social agendas, they serve a socially conservative clien-
tele, and they expect lawyers in the law firm to adopt these conserva-
tive demeanors and work habits.7  Given the troubled economy and 
the pressure on law firms to compete, it is not surprising that law firms 
have become pressure cookers, but there is a serious question as to 
whether the current and growing expectations are sustainable, espe-
cially in light of law firms’ professed interest in equality and diversity.8  
This article describes the masculine culture in law firms and ana-
lyzes how this culture harms both men and women because of their 
gender.  Part II explains MMT, and analyzes the masculine practices 
that exist in modern law firms.  Part III studies a lawsuit brought by a 
law firm associate, a white male father of two who allegedly was fired 
in retaliation for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act9 
                                                                                                                           
 4 I do not mean to imply that Professors Rhode and Darden consider women and minori-
ties to be problems, but that the focus on how to make firms better for these groups is often 
interpreted as dealing with problem employees. 
 5 Simultaneously, because of the emergence of recent technology, the availability of law-
yers worldwide to do associates’ work at cheaper rates, and the global recession, there is signifi-
cant pressure on law firms to change how they do business.  One response would be to “hunker 
down” with abandon.  For example, law firms could decide to forget about diversity concerns and 
concentrate on hiring the hungriest associates (mostly white male) they find, at lower salaries, 
with higher billing requirements.  Or, in the alternative, law firms could decide to outsource most 
of the associate work, thereby avoiding the need to hire many associates.  But these may be 
reactionary responses that will likely result in lower quality work delivered to clients, ultimately 
leading to client dissatisfaction.  Law firms need to be flexible, careful of the money they spend, 
and ready to deliver the services their clients need.  To do so successfully, law firms need to 
understand the younger generation of lawyers, and to create employment relationships with 
those lawyers that will allow both the law firm and the associates to thrive. 
 6 See MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank Rudy 
Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) [hereinafter MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW]. 
 7 Richard Collier, Rethinking Men and Masculinities in the Contemporary Legal Profes-
sion: The Example of Fatherhood, Transnational Business Masculinities, and Work-Life Balance in 
Large Law Firms, 13 NEV. L.J.  410, 428-29 (2013). 
 8 See id. at 428. 
 9 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006). 
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and because of his failure to adhere to the macho stereotypes preva-
lent in the law firm.  Part IV analyzes how the law should respond to 
masculine norms, and suggests that many law firms that impose mas-
culine work norms on their associates violate Title VII’s prohibition of 
gender-based discrimination unless these law firms can prove that 
gender-based cultural norms and requirements are bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications for the job.  The article concludes that, by viewing 
the law firm through the lens of a father who has a non-traditional 
relationship with his family, MMT allows us to understand how gen-
dered requirements in law firms harm parents – men and women – 
with caregiving responsibilities.  Many of these requirements and ex-
pectations are not necessary to the performance of the job or to the 
firm’s business.  To the extent that they are not, firms should rethink 
these requirements that are discouraging women (and many men) 
from working in law firms.  
II.  MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES THEORY AND LAW FIRM 
ENVIRONMENTS 
A. Masculinities and Multidimensional Masculinities Theory 
Multidimensional Masculinities Theory is a legal theory that is an 
outgrowth of Masculinities Studies in social sciences and 
Intersectionality Theory in law.10  It posits that our identities are co-
constituted and that context matters.11  In other words, it is not only 
our gender that defines us at any given time, but also our race, class, 
ability or disability, sexual orientation, and other identities.  These co-
constituted identities, mediated by the context of the situation, will 
affect others’ expectations of us and how we respond. 
Masculinities Theory evolved primarily from sociology and social 
psychology.12  The term “masculinities” in the plural communicates 
that masculinity is not a natural reaction to a person’s biological sex.  
Instead, men achieve their masculinity through performances, or in-
teraction with others, and there are varying ways to perform masculin-
                                                                                                                           
 10 Intersectionality is the concept that unique identities form at the intersection of two or 
more identities.  For example, black women’s identities differ from white women’s and black 
men’s, and the needs of black women are not reflected by these groups with which their identi-
ties overlap (black men and white women).  See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Femi-
nist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989). 
 11 See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Introduction: Masculinities, Multidimen-
sionality, and Law: Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 6, 
at 2 (stating that identities are intertwined and experienced differently in different contexts). 
 12 This description of masculinities theory is derived in large part from Ann C. McGinley, 
Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 703, 706-909 (2011). 
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ity.13  Early masculinities scholars developed the concept of the “heg-
emonic masculinity.”14  Hegemonic masculinity is a set of gender prac-
tices that confers power in a given context.  In some contexts, such as 
large law firms and Fortune 500 boardrooms, “hegemonic masculinity” 
refers to an upper-middle-class white form of masculinity.  In blue-
collar workplaces or prisons, alternative forms of performing mascu-
linity are dominant and more powerful.15  These are often dubbed 
“subversive” masculinities in that these forms of masculinity—
hypermasculine, for example—push back against the hegemonic form 
of masculinity.16  What is important to understand is that there are 
multiple means of performing masculinity.  Hence, the term “mascu-
linities” is used in the plural.  Moreover, not all masculinities are 
equal; there are hierarchies among masculinities.  Particular forms of 
masculinity have more power depending on the context.  Finally, be-
cause masculinity is performative, women, too, can perform masculini-
ties.   
Masculinities Theory recognizes that certain practices are norma-
tive. For many men, defining themselves as “masculine” requires proof 
of two negatives: that they are not feminine or girls, and that they are 
not gay.17  Most men, however, cannot achieve the hegemonic mascu-
linity ideal, and they respond to the pressure to be a “real man” by 
constantly struggling toward achieving the ideal,18 or by reacting to the 
                                                                                                                           
 13 NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 26 
(2010); Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 182, 182-83 (Peter F. Murphy, ed., 
2004). 
 14 R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 77 (2d. ed. 2005). 
 15 Some masculinities theorists refer to the “hegemony of men” as a more accurate term 
that includes hegemonic forms of performing masculinity, but that also recognizes the power 
men possess as a group.  See, e.g., Jeff Hearn, From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of 
Men, 5 FEMINIST THEORY 49, 55-56 (2004).  In my view, concepts of “hegemony of men” and 
hegemonic masculinity are not mutually exclusive.  See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 11, at 5.  
As David Cohen explains, the performance of masculine practices further constructs the power, 
or hegemony of men as a group.  David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation, Masculinities, and Gender-
Variant Individuals, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 181 (describing masculine 
practices enforced against boys’ gender non-conforming behavior to create power). 
 16 Recognizing that there is more than one powerful masculinity depending on the context, 
Devon Carbado uses the term “palatable” masculinity instead of “hegemonic” masculinity to 
describe a particular form of masculinity that is powerful in a particular local setting.  See Devon 
W. Carbado, Masculinity by Law, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 72.  Frank 
Rudy Cooper and I use “hegemonic” masculinity two ways: first, to describe the most powerful, 
norm-setting version of masculinity in a given society; and second, to describe the powerful, 
norm-setting masculinity in a particular local context.  See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 11, at 
5. 
 17 See Kimmel, supra note 13, at 185. 
 18 Id. at 186-87. 
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ideal by engaging in subversive forms of masculinity.19  While men as a 
group are powerful, individual men see themselves as powerless be-
cause of the constant competition to prove themselves to other men.  
Men attempt to gain control, a struggle that is rife with fear, shame, 
and emotional isolation.20  These performances are homosocial — men 
engage in them to prove to other men that they are masculine.21  
Masculinity is invisible in this culture.22  What masculinities schol-
ars mean by this is that masculine behaviors are so predominant that 
we assume they are natural; the way men are.23  Thus, when we talk 
about “gender,” we think about women.  Men are the norm against 
which women are measured. 
In the law firm context, individuals are subject to particular ste-
reotypes depending on their identities, and are expected to perform 
those identities in a way that is pleasing to the firm and its clients.  
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati posit that, in order to make insiders 
more comfortable and to improve their chances of success, employees 
who are outsiders based on their race, gender, class, or sexual orienta-
tion, negotiate and perform their identities in law firms to counter 
negative stereotypes.24  This performance takes a toll.25  A law firm as-
sociate may engage in performances that sacrifice his or her sense of 
self, may suffer psychological costs resulting from performing an un-
true identity, or may perform in a manner that backfires and raises 
other negative stereotypes in the minds of colleagues.26 
But what about white men?  Carbado and Gulati’s theory explic-
itly relies on stereotypes about outsiders in law firms – white women, 
and racial and sexual minorities.27 It does not deal with the concept of 
masculinity prevalent in law firms and how it affects those whom we 
presume to be most comfortable with it.  This predominant form of 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See David L. Collinson, ‘Engineering Humor:’ Masculinity, Joking and Conflict in Shop-
floor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181 passim (1988) (describing masculinities by blue-collar workers 
in a British plant). 
 20 See DOWD, supra note 13, at 31; see also John S. Kang, The Burdens of Manliness, 33 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 496 (2010) (noting that manliness places a burden on men in the 
military who must prove they are not cowardly). 
 21 See Kimmel, supra note 13, at 186-87. 
 22 Michael Kimmel, Integrating Men into the Curriculum, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
181, 181 (1997). 
 23 See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 376, n.62. 
 24 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 
1276-77 (2000) (noting that outsiders negotiate and perform their identities in law firms to fit in 
with firm culture).  The authors do not suggest that the performances are necessarily conscious.  
Rather, like bias, at least a significant portion of these performances likely occur at the uncon-
scious level.  Id. at 1278. 
 25 Id. at 1276-79. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 1267-68. 
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masculinity is that represented by the upper middle class, white male 
breadwinner.  Even though men as a group benefit from the power of 
all men (the patriarchal dividend), some men, even those from the 
privileged group of white, upper middle class men, may not live up to 
the predominant masculinity.  At least some men who do not fall into 
the category of “outsiders” as defined by Carbado and Gulati may 
find the law firm environment oppressive and contrary to their own 
self-images.28  The question becomes, under MMT, whether law and/or 
policy contribute to this environment, an environment that establishes 
a gendered hierarchy among men, and between men and women.  To 
the extent it does, MMT seeks to reveal the hidden (and at times un-
conscious) gendered understandings at the firm, and to encourage the 
law to take masculinities into account, and to recognize that gendered 
requirements, alone, or in combination with raced, classed, and heter-
osexist requirements, may violate the law.29  This exercise of looking at 
white men is a manner of “shifting the lens,” to gain a new perspective 
on law firm practice.  By looking through the lens of the white male 
associate, this new perspective allows us to consider how this envi-
ronment affects not only white men, but also women and minorities.  
Part III tells the story of a white male associate, Ariel Ayanna, 
who sued his law firm for firing him based on his gender and in retali-
ation for his taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.30  Be-
fore moving to Ayanna’s story, the next subsection explains how law 
firm culture is itself masculine and how it requires men to perform a 
particular type of masculinity. 
B. Transnational Business Masculinities: Law Firm Culture as Mas-
culinity Contest 
Law firms are hierarchical institutions where a dominant form of 
hegemonic masculinity prevails.  Law firm culture is both masculine 
and antiquated, making it difficult for women and persons of color, 
but also challenging men, white and of color, to engage in masculine 
competitive behaviors that harm some men and many women.  The 
dominant type of masculinity – hegemonic masculinity – is the norm 
in law firms.  Hegemonic masculinity, as I use it here, is the most pow-
erful, upper middle class, intellectual version of masculinity.  It is com-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See e.g., Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 25-26 (2012) (explaining that the time bind for lawyers is “especially 
acute” and noting that sixty percent of men and women would like to work less). 
 29 See e.g., McGinley& Cooper, supra note 11 at 1-2. 
 30 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006). 
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petitive and aggressive.  It is greedy, boastful, self-confident.  It is elit-
ist and self-serving.   
“The Anglo-American legal adversarial system values qualities 
such as individualism, autonomy, and competition.”31  Because men 
were historically the only members of the legal profession, it is not 
surprising that these qualities, considered by many as masculine, are 
valued in the profession.  In fact, one sociologist argues that public 
confidence in law in part depends on the “masculine ideals which have 
become synonymous with lawyers.”32  Moreover, the legal system de-
pends on a linear career model, one that is available to men who live a 
more traditional lifestyle but infrequently available to women who 
have families.33 
Female lawyers recognize that there is often an invisible gender 
bias in the legal profession.  Women continue to believe that they have 
to be better than, and more assertive than, their male colleagues in 
order to be considered competent lawyers, even though they are more 
disliked for being assertive.34  Unlike male lawyers who are infrequent-
ly mistaken for someone other than a lawyer in the judicial system, 
female lawyers experience mistaken identity (of a less powerful per-
son such as a secretary) frequently.35  Furthermore, female lawyers are 
expected to trivialize instances of sexism, to engage in some sexual 
banter and to do work that is delegated to them on the basis of stereo-
types.36 
David Collinson and Jeff Hearn identify five masculinities that 
appear in workplaces, many of which appear in traditional law firms: 
authoritarianism, paternalism, entrepreneurialism, informalism, and 
careerism.37  Authoritarianism is characterized by intolerance of dis-
sent and an unwillingness to engage in dialogue, and reverence for 
power, control, and obedience.38  Paternalism is a masculine control 
method based on how a patriarch maintains control in a family.39  
Managers enact paternalism by emphasizing personal trust and loyalty 
of subordinates.40  Entrepreneurialism is a highly competitive man-
                                                                                                                           
 31 Andrea Macerollo, The Power of Masculinity in the Legal Profession: Women Lawyers 
and Identity Formation, 25 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 121, 122 (2008). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. at 124. 
 35 Id. at 124-25. 
 36 Id. at 135.  
 37 See generally David Collinson & Jeff Hearn, Naming Men as Men: Implications for 
Work, Organization and Management, 1 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 2, 13 (1994). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.  
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agement style that elevates efficiency and control over other values.41  
It requires subordinates to work long hours, to meet tight deadlines, 
and to be mobile geographically.42  “This . . . form of entrepreneurial-
ism is masculine in that it marginalizes and excludes women both cul-
turally and as organizational members according to their ability to 
separate ‘work’ and ‘home’ and maintain distance from the domestic 
sphere rather than their ability to ‘juggle time’ for work and family 
responsibilities.”43  Men often use informalism to create alliances with 
other men (and some women) by talking about sex, cars, sports, wom-
en, and/or drinking.  Engaging in informal behaviors and speech 
serves the purpose of differentiating men from the women and from 
gender non-conforming men.44  Finally, careerism is a masculine prac-
tice in which many upwardly mobile upper middle-class white men 
engage.45 For these men, upward mobility is key to their masculine 
identities.  To achieve the mobility, careerists work long hours on tight 
deadlines in very competitive environments.46   
These masculine performances either alone or in concert are 
common in law firms.  They co-exist with societal notions of men as 
breadwinners, a masculine norm that places pressure on men to sup-
port their families financially and to rely on a wife as caretaker of the 
children and the home.  They create an environment that makes it 
difficult for women to achieve because of the enduring fact that, at 
least in upper middle class families, women are predominantly the 
caregivers.   
The contemporary law firm is even more gender regimented be-
cause of the extreme business pressures that exist.  Richard Collier 
describes the gendered structure of large law firms: 
[T]he ideal legal professional in City law firms continues to be 
gauged in terms of a three-fold spatial, economic, and corporeal 
nexus – that is, in terms of ideas of bodily pres-
ence/visibility/performance, of economic production (the amount 
of money generated). . . .  This ideal worker is constituted via ref-
erence to still powerful and resonant gendered divisions, practic-
es and cultures — in particular, ideas around embodiment, sexu-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 14. 
 42 Id.  
 43 See Rosslyn Reed, Entrepreneurialism and Paternalism in Australian Management: A 
Gender Critique of the ‘Self-Made’ Man, in MEN AS MANAGERS, MANAGERS AS MEN: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES OF MEN, MASCULINITIES AND MANAGEMENTS 99, 105 (David L. Collinson & Jeff 
Hearn, eds., 1996).  
 44 Collinson & Hearn, supra note 37, at 14-15. 
 45 Id. at 15-16. 
 46 Id.  
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ality, authority and power that are commonly associated with 
(hegemonic) masculinity.  Further, this subject is marked by an 
overarching organizational commitment to the law firm that — 
when “work” and “life” clash—is seen as inevitable taking prece-
dence over what Martha Fineman terms the “inevitable depend-
encies” and vulnerabilities associated with family life.47 
Besides practices that seem to value a certain type of masculinity 
– the hegemonic masculinity – practices and attitudes in large law 
firms are also linked to the reproduction of the “hegemony of men,” 
that is, to the power of men as a group over women as a group.48  Rich-
ard Collier notes that attitudes prevalent in law firms about “hetero-
sexuality, reproduction, child care, men’s authority, male weakness, 
and vulnerability” are influenced by biological notions of masculinity 
and femininity and “inform assumptions about the kind of individual 
who will, and will not, succeed in such a firm.”49  These attitudes reflect 
a gendered acceptance of the “inherently competitive nature of a ca-
reer in large law firms.”50 
Collier notes that large law firms and other corporate entities in 
the fields of global finance and business are not seeing a feminization 
of the legal profession as a result of an increase of female lawyers.51  
Rather, there is an increasing gendered polarization within the legal 
workforce, with a rise of a hyper-competitive business culture.  This 
culture results from a process of “gender segmentation” where, as 
Richard Collier states, “men’s resistance to change as a defense mech-
anism for an embattled profession, leads to continued male domina-
tion.  Crucially, this is done in such a way that these male lawyers can 
seek to maintain their status and rewards while still formally aligning 
with gender neutral, progressive equality policies.”52  In fact, there may 
be “a regressive retrenchment and masculinization of the law” that 
“paradoxically, runs alongside the rise of equality and flexible working 
agendas and the growing recognition of the importance of fathers.”53 
These processes are even more complicated than they appear.  
Norms are changing for masculinity and fatherhood, and normative 
ideas about masculinity change over a man’s lifetime.54  All at the same 
time that law appears to be moving away from the old-fashioned (and 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Collier, supra note 7, at 426-27 (internal citations omitted). 
 48 Id. at 427-28. 
 49 Id. at 427. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 428. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 429. 
 54 Id. at 429-30. 
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perhaps sexist, but gentler) idea of lawyers as “gentlemen.”55  Today, 
many lawyers are engaged in “transnational business masculinities,” a 
“new form of masculinity” that has emerged and that is characterized 
by “egocentrism, conditional loyalties (even to the corporation), and a 
declining sense of responsibility for others (except for the purposes of 
image-making).”56  Whereas in the past lawyers saw law as public ser-
vice, today it is entrepreneurial and hyper-competitive.57  But there is a 
contradiction: as lawyers become more entrepreneurial and hyper-
competitive and remasculinize the law, there have arisen new norms of 
masculinity that emphasize the hands-on father and an acceptance of 
the discourse of gender equality.58  Even the hyper-competitive law 
firms accept and engage in this discourse, but there is significant pres-
sure on male lawyers not to work flexible schedules59 and not to take 
long paternity leaves.60  Moreover, there is a great disparity between 
the percentages of male and female lawyers working part time.61  The 
next Part describes a young father who apparently was caught in the 
contradiction.62  
III. THE FIRING OF A MALE ASSOCIATE 
In Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP,63 the plaintiff was a male associate at 
the defendant law firm in its Boston office.  He was fired after work-
ing at the firm for two years and three months.64  His complaint alleges 
retaliation for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 432. 
 
56
 Id. at 432, quoting R.W. CONNELL, THE MEN AND THE BOYS 52 (2000); FIDELMA ASHE, 
THE NEW POLITICS OF MASCULINITY: MEN, POWER AND RESISTANCE 149–50 (2007). 
 57 Id. at 433. 
 58 Id. at 433-35. 
 59 Margaret Thornton & Joanne Bagust, The Gender Trap: Flexible Work in Corporate 
Legal Practice, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773, 805 (2007). 
 60 Joan C. Williams, et al., Law Firms as Defendants: Family Responsibilities Discrimination 
in Legal Workplaces, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 393, 410 and n.125 and accompanying text (2007). 
 61 Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsi-
bility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 574 (2007).    
 62 I do not imply by the next section that I know whether the facts in the complaint and 
Ayanna’s deposition are true or not.  For purposes of this discussion, I assume that the facts are 
true.  The case settled on February 11, 2013.  See Sheri Qualters, Dechert and Former Associate 
Settle “Macho Culture” Retaliation Case, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 11, 2013), available at 
www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1360503108457&slreturn=20130318183736. 
 63 Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, No. 10-12155-NMG, 2012 WL 5064041 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2012). 
 64 Complaintand [sic] Jury Demand at intro, Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, No. 10-12155-NMG, 
2010 WL 534437 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2010). 
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Act,65 and sex discrimination under the Massachusetts employment 
discrimination law.66   
The complaint tells the story of a young father of two children 
whose wife suffered from several chronic and episodic mental illnesses 
that, at times, left her unable to care for their children.67  Ayanna be-
gan work at Dechert in September 2006.68  At the time, he was a father 
of a two-year-old.69  After the first year of work, Ayanna received good 
reviews from the firm and a $30,000 bonus.70  Nonetheless, during his 
first year, Ayanna alleges, a number of associates and partners at the 
firm commented negatively on his dedication to his family and his 
belief in equal co-parenting of his child.71  His second year was more 
troubled. 
One year after beginning work at Dechert, Ayanna requested a 
temporary transfer to the firm’s Munich, Germany office because his 
wife had received a Fulbright Graduate Fellowship to conduct re-
search in Germany.72  The firm agreed, and Ayanna worked in Germa-
ny for nine months.73  During this time, however, his wife became 
pregnant again, and her mental health condition deteriorated.74 In May 
2008, she was hospitalized shortly in Munich as a result of a suicide 
attempt.75  Ayanna requested his supervisor in the Munich office to 
permit him to work from home, but, his complaint alleges, he stopped 
receiving work.76  A week later, Ayanna applied for leave under the 
Family Medical Leave Act so that he could care for his wife and 
child.77  Ayanna and his family returned to the U.S. the next month and 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006). 
 66 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B § 4(1) (West 2012).  The original complaint also alleged 
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act for discrimination based on his association with 
a person with a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2006), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(2)-(3) (2006), but the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed these claims two months 
after filing the complaint, apparently because he failed to file a charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission in a timely fashion.  
 67 The following description comes from the allegations in the complaint.  Complaintand 
[sic] Jury Demand, supra note 64.  Because they are allegations, they have not been proved, but I 
will assume for the sake of discussion that the plaintiff would have been able to prove these 
allegations had the case gone to trial. 
 68 Id. at intro. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants [sic] Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at intro, No. 10-12155-NMG (D. Mass. June 15, 2012). 
 71 Complaintand [sic] Jury Demand, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 18, 21, 23, 25. 
 72 Id. ¶¶ 29-42. 
 73 Id. ¶ 29.  
 74 Id. ¶ 38.  
 75 Id. ¶ 39.  
 76 Id. ¶¶ 40, 41. 
 77 Id. ¶ 42. 
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his wife gave birth to their second child in July.78  Because of his wife’s 
mental illness, Ayanna needed to care for her and for both of their 
children.79  Ayanna returned to work in Boston in mid-August.80 
After his return, Ayanna alleges, most of his work came from one 
partner at the firm – Christopher Christian.81  Christian, who is alleged 
to be a man who fits the traditional stereotype sanctioned by the 
Dechert culture – a man who leaves all family responsibilities to his 
wife – questioned Ayanna’s commitment to the firm, criticized him for 
leaving at 7 p.m. to take his wife to the hospital, and did not give 
Ayanna enough work assignments for Ayanna to fulfill his billing obli-
gations. 82  Eventually, in December 2008, Ayanna was fired.83  
Ayanna filed his complaint in December 2010 and alleged that 
the firm retaliated against him for taking the FMLA leave, and that 
the firm discriminated against him because of his sex in that he failed 
to fit the firm’s stereotype of how a male lawyer should behave.84 That 
stereotype, he alleged, was of a hard-driving lawyer who leaves child-
care and other family responsibilities to his wife.85  He also alleged that 
female associates with family responsibilities were treated differently.86 
According to the complaint, women in the Financial Services Group, 
where Ayanna worked, were permitted and expected to leave the of-
fice and/or rearrange their schedules in order to take care of family 
obligations, to work from home, and to return to work later in the 
evening.87  Unlike Ayanna, the complaint alleges, the women were not 
derided for taking care of family care responsibilities.88 
Ayanna makes a novel sex discrimination claim, alleging that the 
firm had a “macho” culture and that it discriminated against him for 
his failure to meet the stereotype of macho lawyer.89  According to the 
complaint, Dechert’s masculine culture “equate[s] masculinity with 
relegating caretaking to women and working long hours in the of-
fice.”90  The macho culture “praises and encourages male associates 
and partners to fulfill the stereotypical male role of ceding family re-
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. ¶ 48, 44. 
 79 Id. ¶ 44. 
 80 Id. ¶ 50. 
 81 Id. ¶ 52. 
 82 Id. ¶ 53, 58. 
 83 Id. ¶ 71. 
 84 Id. at intro. 
 85 Id. ¶ 11. 
 86 Id. ¶ 11, 28. 
 87 Id. ¶ 28. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at intro, ¶ 11. 
 90 Id. at intro. 
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sponsibilities to women.”91  The complaint alleges that “caregiving is 
for wives of male attorneys and tolerated only for female attorneys.  
The firm culture does not require female attorneys to conform to the 
‘macho’ stereotype.”92  Because Ayanna was an equal co-parent and he 
rejected the “macho” stereotype, the complaint alleges, Ayanna advo-
cated for more equitable treatment of attorneys who cared for their 
children.93  The complaint gives various examples to support his allega-
tion that the firm culture was socially conservative, and that the firm’s 
lawyers believed that childcare is a women’s job.  Among the exam-
ples are: 
• Two male associates, who were promoted to partners about the 
same time as the plaintiff’s firing, bragged regularly about how 
little time they spent with their families.94 
• Even attorneys whom Ayanna did not know personally knew 
about his parenting responsibilities and commented at a recruit-
ing dinner sarcastically about Ayanna’s complaint about 
work/family balance issues.95 
• On numerous occasions, even though Ayanna completed the 
work assigned, partners and senior male associates complained 
that he had “left early” (7 p.m.; 9 p.m.).96 
• Female attorneys with childcare responsibilities were expected 
to leave or rearrange their schedules to take care of their family 
responsibilities and to work from home, and to return to work 
later on in the evening.  They, unlike Ayanna, were not derided 
for doing so.97 
• Women who have children have a longer, paid parental leave 
than men in the same position have.98 
• Men at Dechert do not take the full four-week paid parental 
leave; at least one of these men confided in the plaintiff that he 
was afraid to take leave beyond a few days because he feared 
negative repercussions.99 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. ¶ 11. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. ¶ 15. 
 94 Id. ¶ 18. 
 95 Id.   
 96 Id. ¶¶ 21, 24, 26. 
 97 Id. ¶ 28. 
 98 Id. ¶ 45. 
 99 Id. ¶¶ 46-47. 
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• The firm demonstrated hostility toward Ayanna’s taking 
FMLA leave, referring to it as “personal leave” and saying “we 
don’t have to grant it to you.”100 
• Ayanna’s supervising attorney, Christian, berated him for leav-
ing at 7 p.m. one night when Ayanna had to take his wife to the 
hospital.101 
• Christian made derisive comments about Ayanna’s need to care 
for his wife and children even though Ayanna regularly worked 
late at the office and worked from home.102 
• Ayanna was reprimanded for coming to work after 9 a.m. one 
morning after dropping off his child at school, even though fe-
male associates came in after 9 a.m. after dropping their children 
off at school, and male associates who did not share parenting re-
sponsibilities came in after 9 a.m. with no adverse consequenc-
es.103 
• When Ayanna was fired, the firm told him that he had insuffi-
cient billable hours and his “personal issues” interfered with his 
work.104 
There are a number of complicating questions in this fact pattern, 
and without the benefit of a trial I would be hard-pressed to deter-
mine whether Ayanna’s case is valid, but the evidence of record ap-
pears to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether the firm 
fired Ayanna for his failure to live up to masculine stereotypes, and in 
retaliation for his taking an FMLA leave.  Dechert filed a motion for 
summary judgment and argued that the sole reason for Ayanna’s fir-
ing was his low billable hours.105  Even adjusting for his FMLA leave, 
the firm contended, Ayanna billed only 1,460 hours during his second 
year, considerably below the 1,950 target of billable hours.106  On the 
other hand, Ayanna alleged in his complaint and testified in his depo-
sition that when he got to Germany, he was given very little work and 
that on several occasions he requested more work and spoke to the 
partners in Boston about the lack of work.107  He testified that Dechert 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. ¶ 48. 
 101 Id. ¶¶ 56-57. 
 102 Id. ¶¶ 59-60. 
 103 Id. ¶¶ 62-63. 
 104 Id. ¶ 71. 
 105 Defendant Dechert LLP’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at intro, No. 10-12155-NMG (D. Mass. May 14, 2012). 
 106 Id. at 10. 
 107 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 29-33, No. 10-12155-NMG (D. Mass. April 
12, 2011).  
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partners in the Boston and D.C. offices assured him that it takes time 
to build a practice and told him not to worry about his low billable 
hours.108  Upon his return, Ayanna alleged that he was assigned to work 
almost exclusively with Christian in retaliation for his taking the 
FMLA leave, and that the work Christian gave him was insufficient to 
bring up his billable hours.109  Ayanna testified in his deposition that he 
was told when he returned that Christian would account for approxi-
mately 60 percent of his work, but that he was given little work from 
other partners. 110 Moreover, after working at the Boston office for a 
number of weeks, Ayanna alleged that he left work at 7 p.m. to take 
his wife to the hospital.111  After that, Ayanna alleged he was assigned 
even less work.112 
As to the sex stereotyping, Ayanna testified that he was treated 
differently than women who had family responsibilities, and he named 
a number of female associates who had better treatment.113  Moreover, 
Ayanna testified that on a number of occasions other associates dis-
cussed how much they worked, bragged that they saw very little of 
their wives and children, and one even bragged that he had the firm 
pay for his wife to visit her family in New Orleans with their children 
so she would leave him alone to work.114  He also testified that he was 
present when another associate asserted that the female associates’ 
work product was inferior to that of the male associates.115  A number 
of male associates told Ayanna that they were afraid to take much 
time off when their children were born because they feared retalia-
tion.116  Furthermore, Ayanna testified that he was known in the firm 
for having an equal co-parenting relationship with his wife, for chal-
lenging the parental leave policies as discriminatory, and for wanting 
to improve the firm’s policies.117  He testified that at a firm meeting in 
which retention of female associates was discussed, he told the partner 
that the firm should have policies that are more family-friendly.118  The 
partner responded, according to Ayanna’s deposition, by stating that it 
was an industry-wide problem and that Dechert could not do anything 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id.  ¶¶ 66-71. 
 109 Id. ¶ 52.   
 110 Ayanna Dep. at 147, 207-11 (Oct. 6, 2011). 
 111 Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 55-58. 
 112 Id. ¶ 58. 
 113 Id. ¶¶ 60-62. 
 114 Ayanna Dep. at 26-38 (Oct. 6, 2011). 
 115 Id. at 49, 143. 
 116 Id. at 130-36. 
 117 Id. at 38-41, 42-43, 48-49, 51-53. 
 118 Id. at 38-44. 
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about it.119  Ayanna also testified that one of the partners rolled his 
eyes and others commented on his “leaving early, or advised him to 
come in early,”120 and that other associates warned him that he should 
stay in the office after hours so people would know he was working 
late.121 
The federal district court granted the summary judgment motion 
in part and denied it in part.122  It concluded that, viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to Ayanna, there was sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s 
reason for firing Ayanna – low billable hours – was a pretext for retal-
iation for Ayanna’s taking of his FMLA leave.123  The court concluded, 
however, that there was insufficient evidence of sex discrimination 
against Ayanna, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on the sex discrimination claim.124  The court noted that 
Ayanna’s “broad claims” about a “’macho’” culture at Dechert were 
not supported by individual instances of discrimination against 
Ayanna.125  Moreover, the court concluded that there was evidence in 
the record that women, too, had some negative repercussions because 
of their childcare responsibilities.126  According to the court, the evi-
dence did not support the conclusion that Christian treated Ayanna 
the way he did because he was a man engaging in childcare responsi-
bilities.127  It was just as likely that his adverse treatment was based on 
his caregiver status alone.128  The case settled before trial on February 
11, 2013.129  
Given the testimony in the record, the federal district court 
should not have granted summary judgment on the allegation of sex 
discrimination based on stereotyping.  The court ignored significant 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could have con-
cluded that the defendant fired Ayanna because of his failure to live 
up to the stereotype of a male lawyer.  It appears that the court did 
not actually understand the sex-stereotyping claim, especially given 
that it required Ayanna to prove differential treatment of men and 
women.  The next Part discusses the theory upon which Ayanna 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Id. at 40-41. 
 120 Id. at 57-60, 160-63, 166. 
 121 Id. at 144. 
 122 Ayanna v. Dechert, No. 10–12155–NMG, 2012 WL 5064041 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2012).  
 123 Id. at *4. 
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should have prevailed on summary judgment.  It also discusses the 
possibility of the employer’s defense in a similar situation.  
IV.  RETHINKING THE STEREOTYPING DOCTRINE AND THE BFOQ 
DEFENSE IN LAW FIRM CULTURE 
A. Masculinities in the Law Firm 
Ayanna’s testimony regarding the atmosphere at the law firm and 
his own treatment reflects masculinities observed by Jeff Hearn and 
David Collinson in their study of corporate workplaces.130  As noted 
above, Collinson and Hearn described authoritarianism, paternalism, 
entrepreneurialism, informalism, and careerism as masculine practices 
in corporate workplaces.131  Ayanna’s testimony clearly describes en-
trepreneurialism and careerism, as well as the hierarchical relation-
ships found in authoritarian workplaces.  Ayanna’s testimony, if be-
lieved by the jury, demonstrates that there is a clear authoritarian rela-
tionship between firm partners and associates.  The partners rely, it 
appears, on associates’ fear that they will not be promoted to partner; 
partners demand “face time” at work to demonstrate how obedient, 
loyal, and hard-working the associate is.   
Entrepreneurialism is evident in the ethic that work is more im-
portant than family and that associates should not bend to family 
pressures.  According to the testimony, women who are mothers may 
have some relief from this ethic, but in the end, the firm, as well as the 
industry, cannot retain female associates,132 perhaps because the ethic 
that hard work and visibility come before family is too brutal and pun-
ishing for many mothers.  But it is not only hard work that makes the 
atmosphere entrepreneurial, authoritarian, and masculine.  It is also 
the expectation that the firm owns the associates’ time and that the 
firm expects, even if there is no pressing work to be done, that the as-
sociates be visible at work, before and after hours, in order to demon-
strate loyalty and submission to the firm.  
Careerism, as expressed through competition, is also evident.  
Male associates speak of the “inferior” work of their female col-
leagues; they also compete over who works the longest hours and who 
spends less time with their families.  In this environment, it is a badge 
of honor, of manly strength, to ignore one’s family.  This environment 
                                                                                                                           
 130 This discussion assumes for the purpose of argument that Ayanna’s testimony truthfully 
and accurately describes the workplace at Dechert.  I do not take the position that his testimony 
is necessarily accurate, but it does appear that the atmosphere of many large law firms may fit 
the description of Ayanna’s testimony. 
 131 Collinson & Hearn, supra note 37, at 13-15. 
 132 Ayanna Dep. at 39-40. 
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and work requirements are clearly masculine – born in the days when 
it was a man’s job to be the breadwinner and supporter of his family.  
The breadwinner is the “ideal worker” in that he has no outside needs 
or responsibilities.133  He has a wife who takes care of every familial 
need, and his job is to support the family economically.  Thus, a man is 
more masculine and a better father if he makes more money.  He is 
less of a man and even less of a father if he gives more care.134  
For women, and men who do not adhere to these traditional be-
liefs and lifestyles, work in the law firm may be difficult.  These associ-
ates have to perform their identities, as Carbado and Gulati describe, 
in a way that may take an emotional and physical toll.135  Men such as 
Ayanna need to perform their masculinity in the acceptable manner – 
to be the breadwinner, not the caretaker.  If they do not, they risk 
their jobs.  Female associates are expected to be caretakers and are 
considered by society to be bad mothers if they ignore their families.  
The firm will give them some leeway to perform their identities in a 
less masculine way, but women must beware: they are often consid-
ered to be not committed to their work once they become mothers, 
and they pay a price for performing their identities in a “motherly” 
way.136  They may risk being placed on the “mommy track” and failing 
to achieve a promotion to partnership.  
B. Assumption that Masculine Practices Are Gender-Neutral  
In Ayanna, the federal district court judge assumed that the mas-
culine characteristics and demands at the law firm are gender-neutral.  
As masculinities scholars note, masculine gender is invisible in a man-
agerial setting,137 as it was to this judge.  In effect, masculinities are so 
prevalent that these gender practices are seen as the definition of 
work rather than as gendered.  Sociologist Patricia Yancey Martin ex-
plains that men’s superior power in most workplaces grants them the 
right to deny that they are practicing masculine behaviors and to de-
                                                                                                                           
 133 JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70 (2000). 
 134 See Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2012) (noting that fathers’ role is to provide for the family financially 
and that they are viewed as inauthentic caregivers). 
 135 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1307 (“[O]utsiders are burdened by identity 
performances.  In this sense, identity perfomances constitute a form of ‘shadow work’ – largely 
unacknowledged and thus unregulated.”). 
 136 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Con-
flicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1297, 1326-27 (2012) (noting that mothers are not considered to 
be authentic or committed workers). 
 137 See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 376 n.62 (2004). 
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fine those behaviors as work itself.138  In other words, when women are 
faced with behaviors that enhance men’s masculinity and power, and 
attempt to call men on the behaviors, men often define what they do 
as work.  
C. Gender Stereotyping and False Comparators 
Ayanna alleged that his treatment occurred because of gender 
stereotyping.  That is, because he was a man engaged in childcare re-
sponsibilities and he took that role seriously, he was treated worse 
than the female associates with childcare responsibilities who per-
formed their law firm associate responsibilities similarly.  The court 
concluded, however, that there was insufficient evidence to prove that 
Ayanna was treated differently than the women who engaged in child 
care responsibilities, and that there was insufficient evidence that his 
treatment resulted from his gender rather than his caregiver status.139  
In fact, as I argue above, there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury 
that Ayanna’s treatment differed from that of his female colleagues 
who had children, but, nonetheless, by requiring the comparative 
proof, the court’s holding demonstrates an unduly formalistic under-
standing of sex stereotyping. 
When dealing with illegal stereotyping, the plaintiff merely needs 
to prove that he or she suffered an adverse action as a result of the 
employer’s stereotypes about the plaintiff.  He or she does not have to 
prove that he or she is treated differently than members of the other 
sex.  Even if the employer treats both women and men badly because 
of their caregiving responsibilities, the employer could be engaging in 
sex discrimination against both groups.  If the job itself is gendered 
male because the firm perceives that the ideal worker is a particular 
type of male breadwinner who exhibits competitive traits, and who has 
the ability because of his family situation to work unlimited hours, 
then it may illegally discriminate against both men and women who 
do not exhibit these traits or flexibility.  For the man, like Ayanna, the 
discrimination because of sex may entail sex stereotyping – the idea 
that Ayanna is not a real man: he is not one of us because he chooses 
to be a caregiver of his wife and children.  For the woman who has 
caregiving responsibilities, the firm may respond by acting on its own 
biases that women with small children are not committed to their 
work.  In both cases, the employer is engaging in sex stereotyping.  The 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Patricia Yancey Martin, “Said and Done” Versus “Saying and Doing”: Gendering Practic-
es, Practicing Gender at Work, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 342, 357 (2003). 
 139 Ayanna v. Dechert, No. 10–12155–NMG, 2012 WL 5064041, at *5 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 
2012). 
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man does not live up to the firm’s sex stereotypes of the ideal male 
worker, and the woman confirms the firm’s sex stereotypes about 
mothers as workers.140  In Back v. Hastings on Hudson Free School Dis-
trict,141 Judge Calabresi for the court stated: 
The principle of Price Waterhouse . . . applies as much to the sup-
position that a woman will conform to a gender stereotype (and 
therefore will not, for example, be dedicated to her job), as to the 
supposition that a woman is unqualified for a position because 
she does not conform to a gender stereotype.142 
Both Back and Ayanna differ somewhat from Price Waterhouse.143  
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was not promoted to the partner-
ship in part because of her failure to conform to feminine sex stereo-
types.144  She was considered too aggressive and she failed to dress and 
behave in an acceptably feminine manner.  The Court explained: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for “‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against in-
dividuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women result-
ing from sex stereotypes.’”145 
The employer placed Hopkins in a double bind because the job 
itself required aggression – one of the very characteristics for which 
Ann Hopkins was punished.  In Ayanna, the employer allegedly dis-
criminated against the plaintiff because of his failure to conform to 
stereotype, but unlike the case in Price Waterhouse, Dechert did not 
place Ayanna in the same double bind.  Ann Hopkins simultaneously 
had to act aggressively to do her job and femininely to be acceptable 
to some of the Price Waterhouse partners.146  Because these partners 
                                                                                                                           
 140 A number of federal courts have held that stereotyping of mothers may be unlawful sex 
discrimination under Title VII.  See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 
107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); Bornstein, supra note 136, at 1330.  The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has also taken the position that stereotyping based on motherhood is illegal sex 
discrimination.  See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF 
WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 10 (May 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html. 
 141 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 142 Id. at 119-20 (citing to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
 143 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 144 Id. at 255-58. 
 145 Id. at 251 (quotation sources omitted). 
 146 Id. (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require 
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave 
aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind”). 
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considered aggressive behavior and failure to conform to gendered 
stereotypes in dress masculine, they judged Hopkins as a woman who 
was not sufficiently feminine, and this prejudice at least partially moti-
vated the partners to vote against Hopkins.  Ayanna, in contrast, was 
expected to follow the male stereotype (which happened to conform 
to how the partners viewed the job) of always being available, hard-
working, and flexible in his hours.  Because he chose to perform his 
identity and work in a different way – a less masculine and more fem-
inine way – the partners allegedly decided to fire him.  While there is 
no double bind imposed on Ayanna, he still suffered from adverse 
treatment based on his failure to adhere to the preferred male stereo-
type. 
Ayanna alleged that the female associates with children were 
treated better than he was.147  In essence, his allegation was that the law 
firm gave mothers more leeway in the way that they juggled their 
caregiving and work responsibilities.  Certainly, if Ayanna at trial sup-
ported this allegation with evidence of differential treatment, he 
would have proved that the firm discriminated against him because of 
his sex.  This differential treatment would have proved two things; 
first, that it was possible to do the job in a different way because the 
firm tolerated mothers who performed that job in this way.  Second, 
combined with evidence that decision makers in the firm were uncom-
fortable with his caregiving role, differential treatment would likely be 
sufficient to demonstrate that Ayanna was fired for failing to live up to 
the firm’s preferred stereotype of how a man should handle father-
hood and work.   
Even without this evidence of unequal treatment of male and fe-
male caregivers, however, Ayanna might have proven that the firm 
fired him because he failed to adhere to stereotypes of how a man 
should act.  In other words, the firm’s requirement, if proved, that all 
of its associates, both male and female, be available to work in the of-
fice for extremely long hours and be totally flexible about workplace 
demands is a gendered requirement.  As Richard Collier notes, law 
firms have cultures that demand bodily presence, visibility, and per-
formances of hyper-masculinity.148  These cultures themselves are mas-
culine and competitive, and the requirement that the job be per-
formed in this manner is itself gendered.  In a culture where mothers 
are still the predominant caregivers of their families, this requirement 
harms women and particularly mothers.  But it also harms fathers who, 
masculinity scholars recognize, are often forced to choose between 
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fulfilling the breadwinner stereotype and actively participating in their 
children’s upbringing.149 
Masculinities scholarship recognizes that a law firm’s demand 
that its associates be available unlimited hours is gendered male be-
cause it describes the historical and traditional arrangement that mar-
ried men have used to further their careers and to financially support 
their families.  This arrangement – that the husband/father work long 
hours in order to support financially the wife/mother and their chil-
dren, and that the wife/mother work in the home, taking care of all of 
the non-work-related obligations of the family including children’s 
schooling and tutoring, babysitting, cooking, cleaning, and washing – 
permits the father to work unlimited hours without worrying about 
the well-being of his family.  It is also gendered male because it de-
scribes a patriarchal relationship where the husband/father is the head 
of the household, who has the power to govern the family relation-
ships and to make decisions for the family.  Law firms and their clients 
benefit from these patriarchal relationships because where the family 
is largely dependent upon the father’s breadwinning capacity, law 
firms and their clients can exercise significant power over the associ-
ate and can exact from the associate work behaviors that are pre-
ferred, but not absolutely necessary to the furtherance of the clients’ 
goals.  
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the law firm practice 
as defined here is masculine because it furthers a competitive envi-
ronment in which men seek to prove their masculinity to one another 
and thereby confirm their own masculinity.  One way of doing so is for 
a man to demonstrate how little sleep he needs, or the small amount 
of time he spends with his family.  These demonstrations are examples 
of men “doing masculinities” – engaging in masculine practices to 
prove their worth to themselves and others.150  This is not to say that 
women do not engage in these masculine practices.  Some do.  But 
merely because women engage in these practices as well does not ne-
gate that the practices are the result of masculine norms, birthed in the 
traditional relationship between husbands/fathers and their families.  
To the extent that the firm’s culture requires associates to engage in 
these practices, it creates job qualifications that are gender-
differentiated.  Enforcing these requirements is similar to saying, “No 
unmanly men need apply.  No feminine women need apply.”  To the 
extent that a male associate is unwilling or unable to conform, the 
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employer’s decision to terminate him is a gender-based decision be-
cause he does not meet the stereotype of how a man should act.  To 
the extent that the firm believes that a woman is unable to conform, 
the employer’s decision to terminate her is also a gender-based deci-
sion because it results from the firm’s stereotype that mothers will not 
be able to do the job.  Moreover, by enforcing these masculinity-based 
requirements, the law firm polices the boundaries of masculinity, en-
suring that those who make it are “real men,” thereby reinforcing the 
masculine identity of the law firm partners.  Thus, enforcing these re-
quirements is about gender in two ways: it assures that only the most 
masculine men will be successful in the firm and it confirms that the 
partners who reinforce the norms are masculine themselves.  The few 
women who make the sacrifices needed for success in this environ-
ment are often considered outliers – not real women – so their pres-
ence is not necessarily threatening to the male partners. 
Title VII forbids discrimination against an employee based on sex 
or gender (after Price Waterhouse) and, to the extent that these are 
gender-based requirements imposed upon associates of the firm, un-
der Title VII, the employer must demonstrate that meeting these re-
quirements is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the 
job.151  The BFOQ is an affirmative defense that the sex-based charac-
teristics are “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par-
ticular business.”152  The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision 
to apply only in very narrow circumstances.153  In essence, the employer 
must prove that the employer’s gender-based requirement relates to 
the “essence” or “central mission” of the employer’s business, and is 
objectively and verifiably necessary to the employee’s performance of 
job tasks and responsibilities.154  
While there are times when law firm associates must work very 
long hours to finish the work they have, many of the gendered re-
quirements will not meet the BFOQ test.  It is not necessarily true, for 
example, that associates who work from 9 a.m. until 11 p.m. are at 
their best at all times while working.  In fact, much of the work time is 
often wasted because sleep-deprived associates cannot necessarily do 
their best work.  Theresa Beiner’s work demonstrates that associates 
who work without sufficient sleep actually have the mental abilities of 
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a person who is intoxicated.155  Moreover, requirements that an associ-
ate demonstrate “face time” or that he forgo a parental leave do not 
usually relate to the essence or central mission of the firm’s business, 
and are not necessary to the performance of job tasks or responsibili-
ties.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Embedded in law firm culture are masculine practices that put 
pressure on associates to work relentless hours, even when the work is 
not pressing.  It is necessary to make the masculine practices and 
standards visible so that Title VII can be used to remedy some of the 
harms done to associates who do not live up to the standards.  Of 
course, law firm work is demanding and those who take law firm jobs 
must be willing to engage in significant, prolonged work, but many of 
the requirements and expectations are not necessary; some may even 
be counterproductive.  Courts should recognize that requiring a per-
son to adhere to these standards is gender discrimination because, 
whether a man or woman, the employer is discriminating because of 
the associate’s failure to live up to a gender stereotype, or her confir-
mation in the employer’s mind of a stereotype that she cannot do the 
work.  The firm should be permitted to prove that the gender-
differentiated requirement is a BFOQ of the job, but the courts should 
examine the BFOQ defenses carefully, continuing to recognize the 
BFOQ as a narrow defense that succeeds only where the masculine 
requirements are objectively and verifiably necessary to the perfor-
mance of job responsibilities and that they relate to the “central mis-
sion” of the firm. 
By viewing gender through the lens of a white male associate, 
MMT permits us to understand not only the situation of the white 
male who does not conform to masculinity requirements, but also that 
of men of color and women who, through no fault of their own, cannot 
or do not conform to the masculine expectations of the law firm.  
Through this exercise, we recognize, in particular, that caregivers who 
leave jobs at law firms are often not exercising free “choice.”  It is of-
ten the invisible gendered expectations and requirements of the asso-
ciate jobs in large law firms that make staying impossible. 
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